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In 1979, a time of clear downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations over such 
sensitive issues as SALT, Soviet troops in Cuba, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the Carter Administration moved ahead with a series of measures 
designed to improve relations with Moscow's major adversary in Asia, the 
PeopPefs Republic of China (P.R.C.). In August 1979, the Administration 
supplemented its earlier decision on normalizing diplomatic relations with 
China by putting aside a barrier in U.S. law to provide official American 
technical support, by pledging to work with Congress to provide expeditiously 
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment and Export-Import Bank loans, and 
by pledging to provide U.S. Government guarantees to American businessmen 
investing in China. In Jan. 1980, the Administration began extensive defense 
cooperation with China and announced it was willing to sell China an array of 
non-lethal military equipment. 
The offers to China prompted considerable criticism from the U.S.S.R. and 
provoked debate among American policy makers in Congress and elsewhere about 
the broader implications of U.S.-China cooperation for U.S. interests 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and in world affaits. 
Analysts on one side of the issue applauded efforts to improve economic, 
political, and military relations with China and urged the United States to 
go further to provide China with sophisticated technology, including weapons, 
and to cooperate more closely in defense planning and foreign policy strategy 
with China against the U.S.S.R. 
On the other side of the debate were those observers who argued that an 
American "tilt" toward China and away from the Soviet Union could result in 
unforeseen Soviet or Chinese actions that could seriously undermine broader 
American foreign interests. They were especially critical of what they saw 
as efforts by some officials in the Administration and Congress to "play the 
Chinese cardw -- a loosely defined concept which has referred to the building 
of closer U.S. political, economic, technical, or military ties with China 
for the purpose o'f gaining greater U.S. leverage against the Soviet Union. 
Since that time, the debate has remained intense as U.S. policy has moved 
closer to a military and strategic alignment with China against the U.S.S.R. 
and its allies. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
The debate over American-Chinese-Soviet relations is not new but has 
existed at least since President Nixon made the American opening to China and 
prompted strategists in the West, as well as in Moscow and Peking, to begin 
to think in terms of a triangular relationship among the three large powers. 
Americans were unable to come to a consensus on how the United States should 
behave in the triangular relationship, and they disagreed particularly on 
what effects a forthcoming American China policy -- a U.S. "tilt" toward 
China -- would have on broader U.S. interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 
This lack of agreement remained somewhat academic for U.S. policy makers 
in the Congress and elsewhere until the hurdle of Sino-American diplomatic 
normalization was overcome. Only after the establishment of full diplomatic 
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relations between China and the United States on Jan. 1, 1979, could American 
planners realistically consider using significant improvements in American 
economic, political and strategic ties with China against the U.S.S.R. Even 
if American policy makers have no intention of playing one communist power 
off against the other, the opportunities for new initiatives toward China 
that have followed from recognition compel them to Consider more carefully 
how such initiatives would be perceived by the Soviet Union and would affect 
broader U.S.-Soviet relations. 
Recent efforts of American leaders to arrive at a proper balance in the 
UoS. policy toward China and the Soviet Union have been seriously complicated 
because these leaders, as well as other informed Americans, have not agreed 
on how U.S. cooperation with China would be likely to affect the Soviet 
Union. Three widely divergent schools of thought have emerged on this issue, 
and their differences have not shown promise of early reconciliation. 
One school of thought, which has not enjoyed a large following, has judged 
that U.S. cooperation with China has little impact on the U.S.S.R. Members 
of this group therefore have thought that, on one hand, it would be futile 
for the United States to try to use its ties with China in order to improve 
the American position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, that 
the evolution of U.S.-P.R.C. relations per se would be unlikely to prejudice 
U.S. interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In effect, they urge the United 
States to pursue improved relations with Peking for their own sake, not for 
any presumed effect -- positive or negative -- they would have on the 
U.S.S.R. 
A second and much larger school of thought has judged that U.S. policy 
toward China has had a substantial effect on the Soviet Union and it has 
favored U.S. initiatives designed to manipulate that policy and other issues 
Concerning Sino-Soviet affairs in ways that would stimulate continued rivalry 
and friction between the two Communist states. These observers have believed 
that Sino-Soviet rivalry has been advantageous for the United States and that 
U.S. leaders should do what they can do to insure a continuation of that 
competition. The spokesmen have stopped well .short of advocating U.S. 
efforts to provoke armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union, noting - 
in particular that such a war would run the risk of prompting a global 
conflict involving the United States and could also seriously upset U.S. 
security, economic, and other interests in East Asia. 
At the same time, some members of this group have claimed that substantial 
reconciliation between Moscow and Peking. would reduce the perceived leverage 
that the United States has gained by having better relations with each of the 
two communist powers than they have with each other. They have asserted that 
such a reconciliation would allow the U.S-S.R. to direct military power away 
from China and toward U.S- interests in Europe and the Middle East, would 
expose the. Japanese to more direct Soviet pressure, and would reduce 
incentives for Peking and Moscow to compete for better relations with the 
United States. 
Though this group is generally thought of a s  a homogeneous one, there is 
one fundamental difference among them. Some have favored an evenhanded 
American policy designed to improve relations with both Moscow and Peking. 
These spokesmen advocated, for example, that the United States follow its 
normalization of diplomatic ties with Peking and welcome for Chinese Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping, with a SALT agreement and summit meeting with Soviet 
leaders. They claimed that such a "balanced" approach assured the United 
States of the most advantegeous position in the triangular relationship, 
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i n a s m u c h  a s  b o t h  c o m m u n i s t  c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  p r e s u m a b l y  c o n t i n u e  t o  s e e  t h e i r  
i n t e r e s t s  a s  s e r v e d  S e t t e r  b y  i m p r o v e d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t h a n  
b y  i m p r o v e d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r .  
T h i s  f a c t i o n  h a s  r e c e n t l y  l o s t  g r o u n d  t o  o t h e r s  i n  t h i s  g r o u p  who h a v e  
d i s a v o w e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  b a l a n c e d  a p p r o a c h .  T h e y  h a v e  s t r e s s e d ,  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  i s  a f a r  g r e a t e r  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t h a n  C h i n a ,  w h i c h  
many o f  t h e m  h a v e  s e e n  a s  a d e  f a c t o  a i l y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e y  h a v e  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  s h o u l d  
a c t i v e l y  e n c o u r a g e  C h i n a  t o  r e m a i n  o n  t h e  A m e r i c a n  s i d e ,  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  
U . S . S . R . ,  a n d  s h o u l d  d o  s o  b y  a s s i s t i n g  i n  t h e  b u i l d u p  o f  C h i n a ' s  p o l i t i c a l ,  
e c o n o m i c  a n d  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  a g a i n s t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  Some o f  t h e s e  
s p o k e s m e n  h a v e  c a l l e d  o n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  s o l i d i f y  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  C h i n a  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  " a n t i h e g e m o n y l '  i . . ,  o p p o s i t i o n  
t o  S o v i e t  e x p a n s i o n  a b r o a d )  s e e n  i n  t h e  S i n o - A m e r i c a n  c o m m u n i q u e s  o f  1 9 7 2  a n d  
o f  1 9 7 8 ;  t h e y  h a v e  s u p p o r t e d  U,S.  e f f o r t s  t o  b a c k  C h i n a  i n  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  o v e r  s u c h  i s s u e s  a s  t h e  S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e  c o n f l i c t  a n d  S o v i e t  
i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  L a o s  a n d  A f g h a n i s t a n ;  t h e y  h a v e  c a l l e d  f o r  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  
A m e r i c a n  t e c h n i c a l  i n t e r c h a n g e ,  l o a n s  a n d  t r a d e  w i t h  C h i n a  d e s i g n e d  t o  a s s i s t  
P e k i n g ' s  r e c e n t  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  p r o g r a m  a n d  t o  b u i l d  C h i n a ' s  e c o n o m i c  s t r e n g t h  
V i s - a - v i s  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ;  a n d  t h e y  h a v e  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
s h o u l d  a l t e r  i t s  a r m s  s a l e s  p o l i c y  a n d  e n c o u r a g e  West E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  
U.S.  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  t o  s e l l  s o h p i s t i c a t e d  arms t o  C h i n a .  
M e a n w h i l e ,  m e m b e r s  o f  a  t h i r d  s c h o o l  o f  t h o u g h t  h a v e  w a r n e d  a g a i n s t  w h a t  
t h e y  h a v e  s e e n  a s  t h e  d a n g e r s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t r y i n g  t o  d i r e c t  C h i n a  
p o l i c y  i n  w a y s  s u p p o s e d l y  a d v a n t a g e o u s  f o r  U.S. i n t e r e s t s  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n .  T h e y  h a v e  g e n e r a l l y  f a v o r e d  a  c a u t i o u s  U.S.  . a p p r o a c h  t o  
i m p r o v e d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  C h i n a ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  a l l o w  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  p r e p a r e  
f o r  a n d  m a n a g e  b e t t e r  t h e  p o s s i b l e  u n f a v o r a b l e  i m p a c t  o f  s u c h  i m p r o v e d  t i e s  
o n  b r o a d e r  U.S. f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i n t e r e s t s .  I n  u r g i n g  c a u t i o n ,  t h e s e  s p o k e s m e n  
h a v e  u s e d  t w o  m a j o r  l i n e s  o f  a r g u m e n t .  Some h a v e  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  
s t a t e s '  r e a l l y  h a s  l i t t l e  a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  p o l i c y  m a k i n g  i n  e i t h e r  P e k i n g  o r  
Moscow a n d  t h a t  a m a n i p u l a t i v e  A m e r i c a n  p o l i c y  c o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  r e s u l t  i n  
u n f o r e s e e n  C h i n e s e  o r  S o v i e t  a c t i o n s  w i t h  c o n s e q u e n c e s  c o n t r a r y  t o  A m e r i c a n  
i n t e r e s t s .  T h u s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  a n u m b e r  o f  a n a l y s t s  h a v e  c l a i m e d  t h a t  U.S.  
l e a d e r s  a d o p t e d  a p o l i c y  i n  f a v o r  o f  C h i n a  a n d  a g a i n s t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
d u r i n g  1 9 7 8  a n d  e a r l y  1 9 7 9  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r e s s u r e  t h e  U.S.S.R.  t o  b e c o m e  m o r e  
a c c o m m o d a t i n g  r e g a r d i n g  A m e r i c a n  i n t e r e s t s  i n  SALT, E a s t - W e s t  c o n f l i c t  i n  
A f r i c a  a n d  o t h e r  U . S . - S o v i e t  i s s u e s .  I n  f a c t ,  h o w e v e r ,  w h i l e  t h e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n  was s a i d  t o  h a v e  p e r s i s t e d  i n  i t s  p o l i c i e s  a g a i n s t  U.S.  i n t e r e s t s ,  
P e k i n g  i s  s e e n  t o  h a v e  u s e d  i t s  c l o s e r  t i e s  w i t h  W a s h i n g t o n  f o r  i t s  own e n d s .  
T h e  C h i n e s e  r e p o r t e d l y  e x p l o i t e d  t h e m  a s  s i g n s  o f  A m e r i c a n  s u p p o r t  f o r  C h i n a  
i n  P e k i n g ' s  d i s p u t e  a n d  m i l i t a r y  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  V i e t n a m  d u r i n g  l a t e  1 9 7 8  
a n d  e a r l y  1 9 7 9 .  
O t h e r  s p o k e s m e n  h a v e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  r e c e n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
e v e n t s  h a s  made i t  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  U.S. l e a d e r s  t o  s e e  c l e a r l y  t h e  p r e c i s e  
e f f e c t s  o f  i m p r o v e d  A m e r i c a n  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  C h i n a  a g a i n s t  t h e  U.S.S.R. A s  a 
c a s e  i n  p o i n t ,  t h e s e  s p o k e s m e n  h a v e  s o m e t i m e s  a r g u e d  a g a i n s t  s u b s t a n t i a l  U.S. 
s u p p o r t  f o r  C h i n a ' s  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a n d  s t r a t e g i c  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  e f f o r t s .  T h e y  
h a v e  n o t e d  t h a t  s u c h  s u p p o r t  may h a v e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  c a u s i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
t o  f e e l  t h e  n e e d  f o r  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  b u t  t h e y  h a v e  
a d d e d  t h a t  i t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  P e k i n g  m i g h t  b e  i n c l i n e d  e v e n t u a l l y  t o  
u s e  i t s  new p o w e r  f o r c e f u l l y  i n  a r e a s  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  -- s u c h  




Debate among the proponents of these widely differing points of view on 
U.S.-China-Soviet relations came into sharper focus after Vice President 
Mondale's visit to China in August 1979 and the concurrent downturn in 
American-Soviet relations over SALT, Cuba and other issues. Earlier in 1979, 
American leaders in Congress had focused primarily on the bilateral aspects 
of Sino-American relations, examining problems concerning future American 
trade and other exchanges with China and future U.S. dealings with Taiwan. 
The broader implications of U.S. China policy for relations with the Soviet 
Union tended to receive only secondary attention, especially since it 
appeared to many leaders in the United States and abroad that the 
Administration was trying to balance its forward movement on relations with 
China with a summit meeting and SALT agreement with Soviet leaders. 
U.S, pledges to China during Mondaleqs visit and the decline in 
U.S.-Soviet relations seemed to alter substantially -- in favor of China and 
against the U.S.S.R. -- past U.S. policy in the triangular relationship. 
(This policy seemed to change even further in the minds of some observers 
when the Administration disclosed on Oct. 1, 1979, simultaneous%y with 
President Carter's speech to the nation announcing U.S. military countermoves 
to the presence of a Soviet bridgade in Cuba, that the United States -- for 
the first time -- was sending the U.S. Defense Secretary to China to discuss 
matters of mutual concern. While announcing the trip to China, 
administration spokesmen still insisted that U.S. policy toward the 
Sino-Soviet powers remained basically in balance.) During Vice President 
Mondaless trip to China, the Administration unilaterally adopted four 
separate measures which significantly would improve economic relations with 
China and would not be provided to the U.S.S.R. for the foreseeable future, 
At least three of these measures required support of the Congress. 
Services to China 
In August 1979, just prior to Vice President MQndale's departure for 
China, administration officials informed the press that President Carter 
would now allow China to receive U.S. technical services under the terms of 
Section 607(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This would 
allow any agency of the U.S. Government to furnish services and commodities 
on an advance-of-fund or reimbursement basis to China. The section limits 
such aid to "friendly" countries, but administration spokesmen maintained 
that in August 1979 President Carter had determined that the P.R.C. was a 
friendly country for the purpose of receiving such services. 
Most-Favored-Nation (Nondiscriminatory) Tariff Treatment 
The Congress was required to vote on a Sino-American trade agreement, 
granting MFN tariff treatment to China, which was submitted by the 
Administration to Congress in October 1979, as promised by Vice President 
Mondale in remarks to Chinese leaders in Peking. 
Under terms of the Trade Act of 1974, MFN status can be granted to the 
P.R.C., after approval by Congress, in the context of a Sino-American 
bilateral commercial agreement valid initially for three years. The 
agreement must, among other things, contain safeguards against market 
disruption, contain agreements for the settlement of commercial disputes, 
make provisions for bilateral consultations, and secure protection for the 
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individual property rights of U.S. nationals equivalent to those contained in 
the' Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 'Property. The 
Sino-American commercial agreement, which the Carter Administration signed 
with the Chinese in July 1979 and which it submitted to Congress for approval 
in October 1979, met these requirements. 
Moreover, under the Jackson-Vanik amendment the MFN status may not be 
presented to any nonmarket economy (i.e., Communist) country that denies its 
citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, or imposes more than nominal 
exit fees or taxes on documents or individuals. President Carter notified 
Congress that he was waiving these provisions when he submitted the Sino-U.S. 
trade agreement to Congress. Such waivers are authorized by law in certain 
circumstances, but the waiver authority is subject to annual Congressional 
review and the possibility of a one-House veto. 
The Congress passed the U.S.-China trade agreement on Jan. 24, 1980. 
Export-Import Bank Credits 
Vice President Mondale pledged to the Chinese leaders that the United 
States would also provide China on a case-by-case basis with up to $2 billion 
in Export-Import Bank credits over the next five years. The Export-Import 
Bank Act of 1945 as amended prohibits any credit transaction by the bank 
directly or indirectly involving a Communist country, unless the President 
determines that such a transaction is in the national interest; more 
importantly, Eximbank credit transactions (export credits and credit 
guarantees) are also subject to the Jackson-Vanik ban and may in general not 
be extended without a waiver to nonmarket economy countries which curb their 
citizens right to emigrate. President Carter's waiver in this regard in Oct. 
1979 concerning the Sino-American trade accord also applied to Eximbank 
credits. 
Investment Guarantees 
Vice President Mondale also promised Chinese leaders that the Carter 
Administration would seek approval from Congress for investment guarantees 
from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) for Americans wishing 
to invest in China. Such approval was granted in August 1980. Like export 
credit transactions, investment guarantees are also subject to the 
Jackson-Vanik provision. 
Soviet Criticism 
Vice President Mondale's visit to China evoked new expressions of 
apprehension from Moscow over the Carter Administration's China policy. 
Moscow commentaries saw the increasing Sino-American cooperation evident in 
the Vice President's trip as a clear indication that the Administration 
intended to play the "China card1' against the U.S.S.R. The commentaries 
represented an apparent hardening of the Soviet line against U.S.-China 
policy. 
Soviet commentators gave special attention to what they saw as closer 
Sino-American collaboration in foreign. policy and in areas of strategic 
interest to the U.S.S.R., especially East Asia. Highlighting the Vice 
President's statement in Peking to the effect that any nation that seeks to 
weaken or isolate China is acting against American in-terests, Soviet 
commentators characterized the pronouncement as a thinly veiled warning to 
the U.S.S.R. They also noted the Vice President's pledges of closer U.S. 
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economic and technical cooperatjon with China. Following past practice, they. 
saw these promises not so much as immediate dangers to the U.S.S.R., but as 
longer term concerns to Soviet interests inasmuch as they will serve to build 
up China's economic strength, which Soviet leaders judge will be used 
eventually to support Chinese forces in future confrontations with the 
U.S.S.R. 
U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC COOPERATION 
Even critics of the U.S. efforts to establish closer relations with China 
generally agreed that U.S.-Chinese economic cooperation was less likely to 
antagonize the U.S.S.R. and compromise other U.S. long-term interests than 
U.S.-Chinese security ties. At present, an apparently increasing number of 
American policymakers in the Administration and Congress are calling for 
increased Sino-American cooperation of an incrementally more strategic 
nature. They want the United States to provide China with advanced 
technology in such areas as electronics, computer science, mining, and oil 
drilling. Some have added that the United States should not only allow West 
European countries to sell arms to China, but should engage in such trade on 
its own. Many suggest that the United States could better protect its 
interests in Asia from Soviet "expansion" by working more closely in foreign 
policy and defense planning with China against the U.S.S.R. They judge in 
particular that the United States, Japan and other noncommunist Asian states 
should consult carefully with China in order to build a common front t s  
prevent the expansion of Soviet influence and power into such areas a s  
Indochina, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific. 
Some of these policy makers judge that such U.S. moves will not only shore 
up American strategic interests in Asia but will also prompt the Soviet Union 
to be more accommodating toward the West and more cautious in trying to gain 
advantage over the United States in other parts of the world. Most recently, 
several policy makers reportedly have called for the United States to use the 
prospect of defense cooperation and the transfer of arms to China as a means 
to cause the Soviet Union to reassess and perhaps pull back from its military 
involvement abroad. 
Opposed to these spokesmen are those American planners who are less 
sanguine about China's intentions and are seriously concerned about possible 
Soviet countermeasures to Sino-American strategic cooperation. Some of them 
point out that China remains one of the most unpredictable major powers in 
world affairs, showing in the past a notable willingness to use force, as 
well as conventional diplomacy, in order to achieve foreign objectives. They 
note in particular that the unity of the Chinese leadership remains a major 
unpredictable element in Chinese foreign policy, and that a major shift in 
the policies of either of the Soviet Union or the United States could result 
in a substantial change in Chinese policies. Thus, for example, they note 
that if the United States adopted a decidedly pro-China tilt in American 
foreign policy and sold arms to China, the result might be a violent Soviet 
response against the weaker link in the Sino-American "alliance" -- China -- 
that could seriously damage the interests of the United States, China, Japan 
and other states important to the United States in the maintenance of 
stability and prosperity in Asia. Perhaps of more immediate importance, some 
of these observers add that closer Sino-American strategic cooperation at a 
time when Chinese leaders are threatening to use force once again against 
Moscow's ally, Vietnam, would only serve to increase the likelihood of a 
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ma5or East-West confrontation breaking out in a part of Asia that is no 
longer seen as of vital importance to American interests. 
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan; Brown Visit to China 
The debate on U.S.-Chinese strategic cooperation has been influenced 
heavily by altered American and Chinese views of Soviet intentions following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. Peking reacted 
strongly to the Soviet move, stating that it posed a direct threat to Chinese 
security and marked the most serious escalation of Soviet ''expansionismW in 
over a decade. The Chinese reaction implied that Peking wished to see the 
United States adopt a more active approach to the Middle East-South Asian 
region in order to counteract the Soviet "threat"; and it signaled what some 
have seen as an even keener Chinese interest in pursuing closer strategic 
cooperation with the United States than in the past -- an interest that was 
reflected during Chinese discussions with Defense Secretary Brown in Peking 
in January 1980. It also demonstrated stronger Chinese suspicion of Soviet 
motives in international affairs -- a development that resulted in Chinese 
suspension on Jan. 20, 1980, of the Sino-Soviet talks which began on China9s 
initiative in the fall of 1979. 
The Soviet action and resulting furor in the United States undercut the 
arguments of those American policymakers who had favored an evenhanded I 
approach toward the Sino-Soviet powers. China's strongly anti-Soviet 
reaction also offset the arguments of those Americans who had been suspicious 
that China could not be trusted to maintain an anti-Soviet posture in 
coordination with the United States. 
A new American approach to the Sino-Soviet powers -- and the apparent 
demise of the former evenhanded strategy -- were apparent in Secretary 
Brown's weeklong visit to China in January 1980. Although the full details 
of the visit were not readily available, several of its accomplishments 
strongly indicated that the United States would side closely with China in 
common efforts to offset Soviet power in Asia. According to various press 
accounts: 
(1) The United States agreed to sell a ground station enabling 
China to receive data of possible military use from Americai 
satellites. 
( 2 )  The United States told China of its willingness to sell the 
P.R.C. an array of non-lethal military equipment, which could 
be expanded in the future. 
( 3 )  The United States and China coordinated closly their parallel 
strategies in support of Pakistan and in backing other 
unspecified efforts -- perhaps including support for 
anti-Soviet Afghan forces -- to thwart Soviet expansion in 
southwest Asia. 
( 4 )  The United States informed China that it would welcome 
Chinese military help against Vietnam in whatever form 
Peking might choose, if Vietnamese forces crossed from 
Cambodian territory into Thailand. 
Haig Visit to China 
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Secretary Haig's visit to China on June 15-17, 1981, furthered U.S.-China 
strategic cooperation against the U.S.S.R. and Soviet-backed governments, 
especially in Indochina and Afghanistan. Haig announced that the United 
States was now willing to consider the sale of lethal military equipment to 
China, on a case-by-case basis. 
U.S. Military Transfers to China. The U.S. announcement that it was now 
willing to sell lethal military equipment to China caused some observers in 
the Congress and elsewhere to examine what role -- if any -- Congress would 
play in future U.S. exports of defense articles and services to the P.R.C. 
Under present law, arms sales to China would be subject to several 
restrictions, some of which involve the Congress. 
The Arms Export Control Act contains several provisions that would govern 
transfers of defense articles to foreign countries, including: 
(1) Section 38(a), which, among other things, requires that 
defense articles or services to be transferred must have an 
export license issued by the Administration. 
(2) Section 36(b), which allows the Congress to disapprove by 
concurrent resolution the transfer of any "major defense 
equipment" worth $7 million or more, or any other defense 
articles or services worth $25 million or more. 
(3) Sections 38 (b) (3) and 36 (c) , regarding commercial transactions, 
which allows the Congress to disapprove by concurrent resolution 
transfers of "major defense equipment" valued at $100 million 
or more. 
( 4 )  Section 3, which sets forth a series of criteria a country 
must meet in order to be eligible to receive defense items 
under the Act, notably the country's agreement not to make 
unauthorized transfer of defense articles supplied under the 
Act or to permit them to be used for purposes other than those 
for which they were originally furnished. 
At the same time, the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(f), would appear 
to limit the furnishing of U.S. grant military assistance to any Communist 
country unless the President issues a narrowly defined waiver. This section 
specifies that the President must determine and report to Congress that: 
such assistance is vital to U.S. security; the recepient country is not 
controlled by the international communist conspiracy; and such assistance 
will further promote the independence of the recepient country from 
international communism. The phrase "Communist country" expressly includes 
the P.R.C. 
Section 505(b) of the Act limits the ability of the President to gran-t 
defense articles at a cost in excess of $3 million in any fiscal year in the 
absence of a waiver by him. According to this section, the President must 
determine that the recepient country conforms to the principles of the U.N.. 
Charter, that the articles transfered will be used to defend the country or 
the free world; that the recepient country is making reasonable efforts to 
build up its own defense, and that the increased ability of the recepient 
country to defend itself is important to the security of the United States. 
Regarding the possible sending of military advisors to China, Section 515 
of the Foreign Assistance Act states that no military assistance advisory 
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grc.up, military mission, or other organization of U.S. military personnel 
performing similar military advisory functions under the Act or the Arms 
Export Control Act may operate in a foreign country like China unless 
specifically authorized by Congress. 
Meanwhile, Congress in recent years has used legislative vehicles to 
impose restrictions on arms transfers to specific foreign countries. Turkey, 
Argentina, and Chile are countries which have been affected by these 
restrictions. 
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p r o p o s e d  t o  C h i n a  t h a t  t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  r e v i v e  t a l k s  a b o u t  
i m p r o v i n g  r e l a t i o n s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  r e o p e n  t h e  b o r d e r  
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s c h e d u l e d  f o r  A u g u s t  b e c a u s e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  p r e s s  
r e p o r t s ,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  n o t  y e t  d e c i d e d  how 
f a r  i t  w a n t s  t o  g o  i n  s e l l i n g  arms t o  C h i n a .  La te r  
r e p o r t s  s a i d  t h e  d e l a y  was  c a u s e d  b y  C h i n e s e  
u n w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s e n d  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  a t  a t i m e  o f  
u n c e r t a i n t y  o v e r  U .S . -Ta iwan  p o l i c y .  
0 7 / 0 2 / 8 1  -- C C P  V i c e  C h a i r m a n  L i  X i a n n i a n  s a i d  t h a t  C h i n a  i s  r e a d y  t o  
p u r c h a s e  m i l i t a r y  t e c h n o l o g y  f r o m  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
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06/17/81 -- Secretary Haig ended three days of talks with 
Chinese leaders in Peking which focused in part 
on closer strategic cooperation against the 
U.S.S.R. and U.S.S.R.-backee regimes, especially 
in Indochina and Afghanistan. Haig also announced 
that the United States was now willing to consider 
the sale of lethal military equipment to China. 
Meanwhile, it was disclosed in Washington that 
the UoS. had been operating an intelligence 
monitoring station in Western China for over a 
year. The station was designed to replace 
stations targeted against the U.S.S.R. which 
were closed in Iran in 1979. 
06/10/81 -- Pentagon officials told the press that the Reagan 
Administration had decided to consider any requests 
China may submit for U.S. weapons. While 
acknowledging that this willingness 
represents a change from past policy, the officials 
stressed that no decision had been made about actually 
selling arms to Peking. 
06/05/81 -- State Department officials told the press that the 
National Security Council agreed the previous day 
to promote a sense of measures to ease trade and other 
economic relations with China and to open the way for 
discussions with the P.R.C. on U.S. arms sales, no 
decision was made on possible U.S. aid to China. 
05/13/81 -- China media announced that Secretary of State Haig 
will visit China during his first tour of East Asia in 
June 1981. Western press reports said that some U.S. 
officials want the agenda to include the sale of U.S. 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to China. 
04/05/81 -- Defense Secretary Weinberger said in London that the 
U.S. response to Soviet intervention in Poland 
could include the sale of U.S. weapons to China. 
03/23/81 -- Former President Gerald Ford met in Peking with 
Deng Xiaoping to discuss the Reagan Administration's 
policy toward China. The visit capped several 
recent steps by the Administration, including a 
formal meeting with the Chinese ambassador by 
President Reagan on Mar. 19, to reassure China on 
U.S.-China relations. Ford reportedly discussed the 
sale of U.S. arms to Taiwan and to the P.R.C. during 
his China visit. 
02/20/81 -- Secretary of State Haig held his first formal meeting with 
with the Chinese ambassador in what Chinese media called a 
"very friendly" atmosphere. 
02/06/81 -- The Reagan Administration announced for the first 
time that it would honor the "solemn undertakings" 
made by the United States in agreeing to normalize 
relations with China in December 1978. The 
announcement, by a State Department spokesman, 
was seen as a gesture to China, whose officials had 
been seeking reassurances of the new Administration's 
commitment to the normalization process. 
01/04/81 -- Senate Deputy Majority Leader Ted Stevens said in 
Peking after two days of talks with Chinese leaders 
that he would not "rule out" U.S. sales of weapons 
to China as a means to counter Soviet "aggressivenessw 
in world affairs. 
12/02/80 -- Peking media strongly criticized the reported remarks 
on U.S,-China-Taiwan relations of Ray Cline, a member 
of Ronald Reagents foreign policy advisory board, 
during Cline's visit to several Asian cities, including 
Taipei. Peking took particular issue with the Taiwan 
Relations Act, which Reagan Administration spokesmen, 
including Cline, said would provide the basis for closer 
American relations with Taiwan in the future. 
10/22/80 -- China and the U.S. signed an agreement providing for the 
annual Chinese purchase of at least 6 million tons of U.S. 
grain from 1981 through 1984. 
10/15/80 -- Peking strongly protested a recent U.S. agreement with 
Taiwan granting Taiwan's unofficial representative in 
the U.S. privileges and immunities similar to those 
given foreign diplomats. 
09/21/80 -- The New York Times reported that China asked the U.S. 
for permission to buy police equipment from American 
manufacturers, touching off a dispute in the Carter 
Administration over whether such sales should be permitted 
in view of China's human rights record. 
09/10/80 -- A delegation of senior U.S. Defense Dept. research experts 
capped a visit to China with the announcement that the 
Carter Administration had approved hundreds of export 
licenses for the sale of advanced U.S. electronic 
gear and military support equipment to China. 
08/23/80 -- Vice Presidential candidate George Bush ended several 
days of talks with top Chinese leaders and departed 
Peking amid Chinese media commentaries strongly 
critical of Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's avowed 
interest in closer U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
07/10/80 -- President Carter held an hour-long meeting with Chinese 
Premier Hua in Tokyo. They reportedly discussed 
bilateral issues as well as Soviet and Vietnamese 
policies in Asia. 
05/29/80 -- Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao ended four days of talks 
with top-level U.S. leaders on future Sino-U.S. military 
cooperation. As a result of the talks, the Carter 
Administration allowed American companies to begin 
negotiations to sell to China a wide range of non-lethal 
equipment including air defense radar, helicopters and 
transport planes, anC secure communication equipment. 
03/17/80 -- Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin began talks 
in Washington with high-level U.S. officials on increased 
U.S.-China security cooperation, especially concerning 
parallel efforts to curb Soviet power in Asia and 
regarding possible U.S. sales of non-lethal military 
equipment to China. At the same time, the Administration 
prepared a lengthy list of the types of non-lethal 
military equipment it was prepared to sell to China. 
01/24/80 -- The Congress approved the China-U.S. trade agreement 
granting most-favored-nation tariff treatment to 
China. 
-- The Pentagon announced that Secretary Brown had told 
the Chinese earlier in the month that the 
United States was now willing to sell China non-lethal 
military equipment, including trucks, communications 
gear, and certain types of early-warning radar. An 
official at the Pentagon reportedly added that the 
list could be expanded in time to include transport 
planes and battlefield computers. 
01/20/80 -- China announced the suspension of talks on normalizing 
Sino-Soviet relations which began in 1979 in Moscow. 
01/13/80 -- Defense Secretary Brown left China after a week of 
talks with Chinese leaders on closerSino-American 
strategic cooperation in Asia, especially against 
Soviet moves in Afghanistan and Soviet-backed expansion 
by Vietnam and Indochina. 
12/31/79 -- Peking's strong reaction to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan included an official warning that the 
Soviet action "poses a direct threat to China's 
security. This cannot but arouse the grave concern 
of the Chingse people." 
-- The House Ways and Means Committee voted 24 to 8 to 
approve the U.S.-China trade agreement. 
10/23/79 -- President Carter submitted the U.S.-China trade 
agreement to Congress for approval. The President 
also issued a proclamation declaring that recent 
Chinese actions allowed him to waive the restrictions 
of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for China. 
l0/16/79 -- State Department Soviet expert Marshall Shulman 
told a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing 
that the Administration would seek passage of 
a trade agreement with China without seeking 
passage for a trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. 
He said consideration of a trade accord with 
Moscow would have to await Senate approval of the 
SALT agreement. 
10/15/79 -- The State Department criticized China for 
sentencing a prominent dissident to a 15-year 
jail term. The action marked the first time the 
U.S. Government of President Carter was known to 
have formally criticized China's treatment of 
human rights. 
10/01/79 -- The Carter Administration disclosed that Defense 
Secretary Brown would visit China later in 1979. 
The report of the first visit by a U.S. 
Defense Secretary to China came on the same day 
that President Carter announced U.S. military 
moves to counter the presence of Soviet troops 
in Cuba. 
09/27/79 -- Sino-Soviet negotiations designed to improve 
relations between the two communist powers opened 
in Moscow. The start of the talks culminated a 
6-month period of preliminary diplomatic interchange 
between the two sides on the agenda, location and 
diplomatic level of the negotiations. 
08/29/79 -- Vice President Mondale left Peking after several 
days of meetings with top Chinese leaders and the 
signing of Sino-American accords on cultural exchanges 
and cooperation in hydroelectric power. Mondale 
told the Chinese that the Administration would 
seek the approval of Congress in 1979 for the 
recently negotiated U.S.-China trade agreement 
and would also seek Congressional approval for 
OPIC guarantees for Americans investing in China; 
he added that the United States was prepared to 
establish Export-Import bank credit arrangements 
for the P.R.C. on a case-by-case basis up to a 
total of $2 billion over a 5-year period. 
07/07/79 -- The United States and China signed a trade 
agreement which, if endorsed by Congress, will 
provide most-favored-nation tariff treatment 
for China. 
05/14/79 -- Secretary of Commerce Kreps capped her visit 
to China by initialing a Sino-American trade 
agreement. Earlier in her visit, Secretary 
Kreps signed a U.S.-P.R.C. agreement on financial 
claims and frozen assets which had been initialed 
during Secretary Blumenthal's visit to China in 
March 1979. 
03/02/79 -- Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal announced at 
the end of his week-long visit to Peking that the 
Chinese had agreed to pay Americans $80.5 million 
in settlement of outstanding claims. 
02/17/79 -- Charging numerous border incursions by Vietnamese, 
the Chinese announced they had launched a 
"counterattack" in order to teach the Vietnamese 
a lesson. The U.S. sought to prevent eruption 
into a wider war by calling on both nations to 
withdraw their troops behind their own borders and 
cautioning the Soviet Union against direct 
involvement. 
02/04/79 -- U.S. and P.R.C. leaders hailed the normalization of 
their diplomatic relations during Chinese Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States 
from Jan. 29 to Feb. 4, 1979. 
The two sides announced in a joint 
press communique that they had agreed to conclude 
trade, aviation, and shipping agreements, and they 
used the communique to reiterate their joint 
opposition to international "hegemony." 
12/15/78 -- President Carter announced that the United States 
would establish diplomatic relations with the 
P.R.C. as of Jan. 1, 1979, would break its 
diplomatic ties with the Nationalist 
Chinese administration on Taiwan on that date, and 
would terminate its defense treaty with Taiwan 
a year later. 
11/24/78 -- The New York Times reported that the Carter 
Administration had approved a request by France to 
sell an American-designed nuclear power plant in 
China. 
11/03/78 -- Secretary of State Vance said that the United 
States would not sell military weapons to China 
or the Soviet Union but indicated that the 
United States would not oppose the sale of military 
weapons to China by West European countries. 
10/31/78 -- The Washington Star reported that the United 
States had agreed to sell China a communications 
satellite that will improve telephone and television 
links in China. 
07/26/79 -- The Washington Post reported that, while the 
Carter Administration was continuing a moratorium on 
most high-level official trips to the Soviet 
Union, it has approved new official missions to 
China, including a trip by Energy Secretary 
Schlesinger. 
05/23/78 -- National Security Adviser Brzezinski departed 
Peking after three days of talks with top 
Chinese leaders. 
05/09/78 -- A violation of the Sino-Soviet border by Soviet 
border guards prompted the first public exchange 
between Moscow and Peking over a specific border 
incideptn in four years. 
10/31/77 -- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told editors of 
U.S. News and World Report that it would be a 
"great mistakew for the United States to supply 
military equipment or assistance to either China 
or the Soviet Union, and noted that the leaders 
of neither country had expressed an interest 
in acquiring such equipment. 
06/23/77 -- The New York Times reported that the Carter 
Administration had decided -- at least for the 
time being -- against selling military technology 
to China. 
02/28/77 -- The New York Times reported commentary by sources 
in Washington That Peking had shown renewed 
interest in purchasing Western weapons to help 
modernize the Chinese communist army. 
10/29/76 -- The U.S. state Department announced that it 
would allow the private sale of sohpisticated 
Cyber 172 computers and ,support systems to 
China and the Soviet Union. 
02/21/72 -- President Nixon began a seven-day visit to China. 
The United States and China issued a joint 
communique on February 26 in Shanghai which 
indicated that negotiations would continue toward 
normalization of relations, efforts would be 
made to increase the level of trade, and bilateral 
exchanges would be increased. Both sides affirmed 
opposition to "hegemony" in Asia. 
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